The Guilty But Mentally Ill Alternative by unknown
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 8 | Issue 1 Article 4
1982
The Guilty But Mentally Ill Alternative
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
(1982) "The Guilty But Mentally Ill Alternative," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 8: Iss. 1, Article 4.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss1/4
NOTES
THE GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL ALTERNATIVE
The issue of insanity in criminal cases confronts the legal system with a dilemma.
Should a defendant escape responsibility for criminal conduct because he was insane
at the time he acted although he intended the act and its consequences? The guilty-
but-mentally-ill verdict gives juries the opportunity to recognize a criminal defend-
ant's psychological disorder and still assign him responsibility for his antisocial
conduct. This Note reviews the evolution of the treatment of insanity in criminal
cases and advocates use of the guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict as the most socially
beneficial and humane means of dealing with the criminally insane.
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I. INTRODUCTION
At common law an unlawful act was not a crime unless it was commit-
ted with an evil intent. I The legal maxim "actus nonfacit reum msi mens sit
rea,"2 known today as mens rea, embodied the idea that an act does not
make one guilty unless the mind is guilty. 3 The concept of mens rea
1. "So that to constitute a crime against human laws, there must be, first, a vitious
will; and, secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon such vitious will." 4 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES 21 (12th ed. 1795).
2. "An act does not make [the doer of it] guilty, unless the mind be guilty.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 34 (5th ed. 1979).
3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 29 (5th ed. 1979). The modern interpretation of the
mens rea concept is more expansive than that under common law. Under the old inter-
pretation of common law, "an unwarrantable act without a vitious will is no crime at all."
4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 21. Today, criminal intent, or mens rea, encompasses
several states of mind rather than only the "vitious will." See infra note 5 and accompany-
ing text.
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reflects the popular belief that if a person commits a criminal act but
does not possess a criminal state of mind, he is blameless and unaccount-
able for his action.4 Today, most statutory crimes by definition require
that the offender commit a crime in a purposeful, knowledgeable, reck-
less, or negligent manner.5
One offender who traditionally has been held blameless and unac-
countable for his behavior is the insane person.6 The defense of insanity
allows "blameless" persons to escape the legal consequences of otherwise
illegal conduct. The insanity defense forces juries into an "all or noth-
ing" situation.7 Although a defendant pleading the defense admits that
4. See A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 11-15 (1967). For an overview of
theories and objectives of criminal law, see S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW
AND ITS PROCESSES 19-21 (3d ed. 1975); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMI-
NAL LAW 5-10 (1972).
5. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). For greater detail
as to these criminal states of mind, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955); Perkins, "Knowledge" as a Mens Rea Requirement, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 953 (1978). Not
all crimes require a criminal mental element. Acts termed malum prohibitum, although not
inherently immoral, are crimes because their commission are expressly forbidden by statu-
tory law. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 865 (5th ed. 1979). The defendant is held strictly
liable upon proof of his commission of the offense. E.g., Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246, 252-56 (1952); State v. Shevlin-Carpenter Co., 99 Minn. 158, 164-66, 108 N.W.
935, 937-38, afd, 218 U.S. 57 (1910). The legislature implies a guilty mind from the
commission of an act it presumes to be dangerous. See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 372-75 (3d ed. 1923). The strict liability standard of ma/um prohibitum
offenses differs greatly from the general rule at common law where "no crime can be
committed unless there is mens rea." Williamson v. Norris, I Q.B. 7, 14 (1898). Legisla-
tures, nonetheless, have the power to define crimes without requiring any criminal intent
(mens rea). E.g., Chicago, B. & W. Ry. v. United States, 220 U.S. 559, 578-79 (1911);
State v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 310 Minn. 535, 538, 246 N.W.2d 692, 695 (1976).
Crimes not requiring proof of mens rea are the exception of the early common law, and
are still the exception today. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 985 (D.C. Cir.
1972); see Brown v. State, 23 Del. 159, 163-65, 74 A. 836, 837-38 (1909); 3 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, supra, at 374. For histories of the development of mens rea at common law, see
Levitt, The O'gin of the Doctrtne of Mens Rea, 17 ILL. L. REV. 117 (1922); Turner, The Mental
Element in Cnnes at Common Law, 6 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 31 (1936). For a brief discussion of
mens rea and its application in Minnesota criminal law, see D. SLEE, SELECTED CRIMI-
NAL DEFENSES 13-22 (Minn. County Att'y Council Tech. Notes & Briefing Papers No. 2D,
Oct. 1978).
6. See, e.g., People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 836
(1949); State v. Booth, 169 N.W.2d 869 (Iowa 1969), rev'don othr grounds, State v. Thomas,
219 N.W.2d 3 (Iowa 1974); Moore v. State, 237 So. 2d 844 (Miss. 1970); State v. Jones, 278
N.C. 259, 179 S.E.2d 433 (1971). Other offenders may be regarded as blameless based on
other defenses. E.g., State v. Caddell, 287 N.C. 266, 215 S.E.2d 348 (1975) (unconscious-
ness); CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (West 1970 & Supp. 1982) (mental deficiency, ignorance or
mistake of fact, life threatened); MINN. STAT. § 609.055 (1980) (under age of 14).
7. A juror who wishes to condemn the defendant's action, but also desires to help the
defendant receive the proper medical treatment might believe that if the defendant is
convicted he will go to prison rather than to a hospital because the juror is usually not
instructed as to the significance of acquittal by reason of insanity. Eg., Apgar v. United
States, 440 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1971); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967);
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he committed the wrongful act, "[alcquittal by reason of insanity sug-
gests no condemnation of the defendant's action."8 Nevertheless, con-
victing a defendant who was insane when he acted runs contrary to the
fundamental requisite of criminal law that the defendant intended the
results of his actions.
First this Note will briefly review the historical development of the
insanity defense.9 Alternatives to the insanity defense will then be dis-
cussed.' 0 Finally, a proposal that incorporates the guilty-but-mentally-ill
verdict is offered as the alternative that best meets the medical needs of
the insane offender while protecting the community from the offender's
dangerous propensities. l I
II. MODERN HISTORY OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE
A. The M'Naghten Standard
In 1843, in DanielM'Naghten-s Case,12 the English court stated the legal
standard of the insanity defense that still is used in many United States
jurisdictions. 1
3
State v. Moeller, 50 Hawaii 110, 433 P.2d 136 (1967); State v. Park, 159 Me. 328, 193 A.2d
1 (1963). Some courts seem to be changing in favor of an instruction to the jury that if the
defendant is found not guilty, he will not be immediately released. E.g., People v. Hamp-
ton, 384 Mich. 669, 187 N.W.2d 404 (1971); State v. Shoffner, 31 Wis. 2d 412, 143 N.W.2d
458 (1966) (refusal to instruct not prejudicial error but court would prefer that instruction
be given). One court has held that a jury has a right to know of the meaning of such a
verdict. Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725, 728-29 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
8. Thompson, The Future of the Insanity Defense in Illinois, 26 DE PAUL L. REV. 359,
370 (1977).
9. See infra notes 12-49 and accompanying text.
10. See infa notes 66-92 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 93-113 and accompanying text.
12. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). In M'Naghten, a criminal trial was held after Daniel
M'Naghten shot and killed Edward Drummong, the principal secretary to Prime Minister
Robert Pell. See J. BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND 95 (1955). Nine medical witnesses testified
as to the insanity of M'Naghten. Id. at 101. The jury acquitted the defendant with a
verdict of "[n]ot guilty, on the ground of insanity." Id. at 102. The jury was instructed to
apply what has become known as the "right-wrong test" which emphasizes the defend-
ant's knowledge of both the legal and moral nature of the act. See S. GLUECK, MENTAL
DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 163 (1925). Although the M'Naghten rule is often
called the right-wrong test, the rule actually encompasses two tests. The defendant is
relieved of criminal responsibility if (1) he did not have the capacity to understand the
nature and quality of his act, or (2) he lacked the ability to distinguish between right and
wrong with respect to the act. See, e.g., Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531, 539 (Tenn.
1977). See generally, Note, Modern Insanity Tests-Aternatives, 15 WASHBURN L.J. 88, 93-94
(1976). The M'Naghten rule is similar to the "wild beast test" set forth in the trial of
Edward Arnold nearly 120 years earlier. See infra note 13.
13. See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. The history of the legal treatment of
insanity prior to the thirteenth century is unclear. See generaloy S. GLUECK, supra note 12,
at 123-24. By the mid-thirteenth century pardons by the King of England were fairly
common for persons who committed homicides while of unsound mind. See J. BIGGS,
supra note 12, at 83. During the late 1200's, insanity was recognized as grounds for mitiga-
3
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[E]very man is to be presumed sane, and to possess a sufficient degree
of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved
to their satisfaction; and that to establish a defence on the ground of
insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing
of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of rea-
son, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong. 14
The M'Naghlen rule became the popular standard to determine whether
a defendant could invoke the insanity defense.15 All of the existing
United States, except New Hampshire,16 have at some time used the
tion of punishment. See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 315-16, 372-75. "Absolute
'madness' was a complete defense to a criminal charge" in the early fourteenth century.
See J. BIGGS, supra note 12, at 83; S. GLU.ECK, supra note 12, at 125. Beginning in the
fifteenth century, several works were written on insanity which discussed the theory that
an insane individual was incapable of distinguishing right from wrong. See J. BIGGS, supra
note 12, at 83-88. In 1723, an English court used this theory to develop the "wild beast
test" of insanity.
[I]f the man be deprived of his reason, and consequently of his intention, he
cannot be guilty. . . . It is not every kind of frantic humor or something unac-
countable in a man's actions, that points him out to be such a madman as is to
be exempted from punishment; it must be such a madman as is to be a man that
is totally depr'ved of his understanding and memo and doth not know what he is
doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast, such a one is never
the object of punishment.
Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 764 (1724) (emphasis added). Glueck points out that
the remainder of the court's charge was and is neglected often by judges and commenta-
tors: "[W]hether the condition this man was in ... doth shew a man, who knew what he
was doing, and was able to distinguish whether he was doing good or evil, and understood
what he did." S. GLUECK, supra note 12, at 139 n.2. Thus, the "wild beast test" foreshad-
owed M'Naghten's right-wrong test. The wild beast test required the defendant to demon-
strate his deprivation of memory and understanding, but equated insanity with the
inability to distinguish right from wrong. Id. at 142-44.
In 1800 in Had flds Case, 27 State Trials 1281, 27 How. St. Tr. 1282 (1800), an Eng-
lish Court rejected the requirement that the defendant must be deprived of all mental
faculty before asserting insanity as a defense. See R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE
OF INSANITY 19 (1967). The decision appeared to sever the tie between insanity and the
ability to distinguish between right and wrong. See id. The Chief Justice instructed the
jury as follows: "I believe it is necessary for me to submit to you, whether you will find
that the prisoner, at the time he committed the act, was not so under the guidance of
reason as to be answerable for this act." J. BIGGS, supra note 12, at 90. The court held
that the defendant was entitled to assert a defense of insanity even though he could distin-
guish right from wrong because his unlawful conduct resulted from delusional beliefs.
14. Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843); see also S. GLUECK, sUra
note 12, at 178-79.
15. Glueck notes that the M'AlVaghten rule has been extended freely to cases of mental
disorders which were not in the M'Naghten judges' philosophy. S. GLUECK, supra note 12,
at 163.
16. In New Hampshire, the question of insanity is purely one of fact. If the defend-
ant's action were the product of a mental disease, the defendant is not guilty by reason of
insanity. See State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 398-99 (1871); State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 442
[Vol. 8
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M'Naghten rule or a variation thereof.t7 Today, nine states have enacted
the M'Naghten rule by statute.' 8 Nine other states follow the M'Naghten
rule by judicial decision. 19
The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the MNaghten rule in 1865.20
In 1885, the Minnesota legislature included the M'Naghten rule in the
state's penal code.21 State v. Seott22 was the first case to test the new stat-
ute. The Scott court held that the language of the statute was plain and
unambiguous, and provided the exclusive ground upon which the in-
sanity defense was to be allowed. 23 Minnesota's statutory version of
M'Naghten has changed little since 1885. The current version provides
(1870). For a discussion of the New Hampshire test, see infra notes 40-42 and accompany-
ing text.
17. See S. GLUECK, supra note 12, at 214. Most of the variations from the M'Naghten
rule superimpose the "irresistible impulse" test. See tnfta notes 32-38 and accompanying
text.
18. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502 (1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-702 (1978); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 701.4 (West 1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:14 (West 1974); MINN. STAT.
§ 611.026 (1980); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-1 (West 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-3 (Cum.
Supp. 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 152 (West 1958); S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 22-
1-2(22) (1979 & Supp. 1980).
19. Byrd v. State, 178 So. 2d 886 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Hill v. State, 339 So. 2d
1382 (Miss. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 987 (1977); State v. Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 570,
250 N.W.2d 881, 893, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977); Clark v. State, 95 Nev. 24, 27, 588
P.2d 1027, 1029 (1979); State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 47, 67-68, 257 S.E.2d 597, 612 (1979);
State v. Staten, 25 Ohio St. 2d 107, 109, 267 N.E.2d 122, 124 (1971); Commonwealth v.
Hicks, 483 Pa. 305, 310, 396 A.2d 1183, 1185 (1979); State v. Law, 270 S.C. 664, 667-68,
244 S.E.2d 302, 304 (1978); State v. Ferrick, 81 Wash. 2d 942, 943-44, 506 P.2d 860, 861
(1973).
20. See State v. Shippey, 10 Minn. 223, 228-29, 10 Gil. 108-81 (1865). Since Shippe
the court has consistently applied the M'Naghten rule. See, e.g., State v. Rawland, 294
Minn. 17, 46, 199 N.W.2d 774, 790 (1972); State v. Dhaemers, 276 Minn. 332, 339, 150
N.W.2d 61, 66 (1967); State v. Finn, 257 Minn. 138, 140-44, 100 N.W.2d 508, 510-13
(1960); State v. Simenson, 195 Minn. 258, 261-64, 262 N.W. 638, 639-41 (1935); State v.
Scott, 41 Minn. 365, 369-72, 43 N.W. 62, 63-64 (1889); State v. Gut, 13 Minn. 341, 358-59,
13 Gil. 315, 331-32 (1868), afd, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 35 (1869) (defendant not entitled to
acquittal if he had capacity sufficient to enable him to distinguish right from wrong, to
understand the nature and consequences of his acts, and mental ability sufficient to apply
that knowledge to his own case).
21. Minn. Penal Code § 19 (1886):
A person is not excused from criminal liability as a idiot, imbecile, lunatic,
or insane person, except upon proof that, at the time of committing the alleged
criminal act, he was laboring under such a defect of reason, as either (1) [nlot to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or (2) [n]ot to know that
the act was wrong.
22. 41 Minn. 365, 43 N.W. 62 (1889).
23. Id. at 372, 43 N.W. at 64. The court concluded that the statutory language did
not leave room to include the irresistible impulse test, because "its omission from the state-
ment in the statute. . . has not been from mere inadvertence, but that it was intended to
be excluded." Id. at 369, 43 N.W. at 63. The court has held consistently that the test
cannot be superimposed upon the codification of the M'Naghlen rule. See, e.g., State v.
Eubanks, 277 Minn. 257, 264, 152 N.W.2d 453, 458 (1967), cer. denied, 390 U.S. 946
(1968); State v. Finn, 257 Minn. 138, 140-44, 100 N.W.2d 508, 510-13 (1960); State v.
19821
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that a person "shall not be excused from criminal liability except upon
proof that at the time of committing the alleged criminal act he was
labouring under such a defect of reason, from [mental illness or mental
deficiency], as not to know the nature or his act, or that it was wrong."24
Although historically the court has felt bound to adhere strictly to the
statutory language, 25 in State v. Rawand26 the court suggested that the
statute be repealed and the M'iaghten rule "should have been discarded
with the horse and buggy. . . so that the courts could develop rules for
determining mental competency more in harmony with advances made
Simenson, 195 Minn. 258, 263, 262 N.W. 638, 640-41 (1935); State v. Scott, 41 Minn. 365,
371-72, 43 N.W. 62, 64 (1889).
24. MINN. STAT. § 611.026 (1980). In 1971 the statute was amended. "[M]entally ill
or mentally deficient" replaced the words "idiocy, imbecility, lunacy, or insanity." Act of
May 17, 1971, ch. 352, § 1, 1971 Minn. Laws 602. A "mentally ill person" is
any person who has a substantial psychiatric disorder of thought, mood, percep-
tion, orientation, or memory which grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity
to recognize reality, or to reason or understand, which (a) is manifested by in-
stances of grossly disturbed behavior or faulty perceptions; and (b) poses a sub-
stantial likelihood of physical harm to himself or others as demonstrated by (i) a
recent attempt or threaten to physically harm himself or others, or (ii) a failure
to provide necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical care for himself, as a result
of the impairment.
Minnesota Commitment Act of 1982, § 2, 1982 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1286, 1287-88 (to
be codified at MINN. STAT. § 253B.02(13)). A "mentally retarded person" replaced "men-
tally deficient person" in 1982 and is defined as
any person (a) who has been diagnosed as having significantly subaverage intel-
lectual functioning existing concurrently with demonstrated deficits in adaptive
behavior; and (b) whose recent conduct is a result of mental retardation and
poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to himself or others in that there
has been (i) a recent attempt or threat to physically harm himself or others, or
(ii) a failure and inability to provide necessary food, clothing, shelter, safety, or
medical care for himself.
Id., 1982 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. at 1288 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 253B.02(14)).
The defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence either
that she did not know the nature of her act or that she did not know that the act was
wrong. See State v. Pautz, 299 Minn. 113, 118, 217 N.W.2d 190, 193 (1974); State v. Bott,
310 Minn. 331, 335, 246 N.W.2d 48, 52 (1976); State v. Mytych, 292 Minn. 248, 252-55,
194 N.W.2d 276, 279-81 (1972) (burden does not violate defendant's fourteenth amend-
ment right to due process of law). "[I1n every criminal proceeding, a person is presumed
to be responsible for his acts and the burden of rebutting such presumption is upon him."
MINN. STAT. § 611.025 (1980). Expert testimony is neither necessary nor binding in a
determination of a defendant's sanity. See State v. Hoskins, 292 Minn. 111, 137-38, 193
N.W.2d 802, 818-19 (1972).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that because MINN. STAT. § 611.026 is so
clear and unambiguous, it needs no judicial interpretation. See, e.g., State v. Finn, 257
Minn. 138, 142-44, 100 N.W.2d 508, 512-13 (1960); State v. Scott, 41 Minn. 365, 372-73,
43 N.W. 62, 64-65 (1889) (language of statute very clearly expresses its meaning). But see
State v. Rawland, 294 Minn. 17, 36, 199 N.W.2d 774, 785 (1972) (statute not as simple as
once assumed).
25. See, e.g., State v. Dhaemers, 276 Minn. 332, 339, 150 N.W.2d 61, 66 (1967). See
generally State v. Finn, 257 Minn. 138, 100 N.W.2d 508 (1960).
26. 294 Minn. 17, 199 N.W.2d 774 (1972).
[Vol. 8
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in this scientific field." 2 7 The court stated that the determination of in-
sanity should focus on the defendant's mind as a whole rather than on
just the cognitive capacities of the defendant as M'Naghten seemed to re-
quire.28 To properly determine the issue of insanity without severely
straining the statutory language, the court allowed consideration of evi-
dence relating to volition and the capacity to control behavior as well as
cognition.29 Consideration of the defendant's mind as a whole by the
factfinder was for evidentiary purposes only and was not to expand the
insanity defense as stated by the statute. 30 In Minnesota, when the in-
sanity defense is raised, the issue remains whether or not the defendant
was laboring under such a defect of reason that he did not know the
nature of his act or that the act was wrong.
31
B. Departures from M'Naghten in the United States
1. The Irresistible Impulse Test
Some courts have coupled the M'Naghten rule with a test of the defend-
ant's ability to resist the impulse to commit the act.32 Under the irresisti-
27. Id. at 35-36, 199 N.W.2d at 784 quoting State v. Dhaemers, 276 Minn. 332, 339,
150 N.W.2d 61, 66 (1967).
28. See State v. Rawland, 294 Minn. at 46, 199 N.W.2d at 790.
29. This portion of the decision was influenced greatly by Judge Blackmun's opinion
in Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967). In Pope, Judge Blackmun stated
that if the trial judge's charge to the jury
appropriately embraces and requires positive conclusions by the jury as to the
defendant's cognition, his volition, and his capacity to control his behavior, and
if these three elements of knowledge, will and choice are emphasized in the
charge as essential and critical constituents of legal sanity, we shall usually re-
gard the charge as legally sufficient. . . . [W]e think this approach is sound
because it preserves and builds upon those elements of A'Naghten and of lack of
control which are acceptable in the present day, and yet modernizes them in
terms which the jury can grasp and intelligently apply.
372 F.2d at 736 (emphasis omitted). The mens rea requirement has long encompassed
volition as well as cognition. S. GLUECK, supra note 12, at 180; f. State v. Rawland, 294
Minn. at 38, 199 N.W.2d at 786 (attempt to save statute from possible constitutional ques-
tions by expanding evidentiary scope to include volitional incapacity and avoid contra-
vention of mens rea doctrine). The Rawland court indicated that "the statute, strictly and
literally construed, may be subject to constitutional objections." Id.
30. 294 Minn. at 45-46, 199 N.W.2d at 790. This was further clarified in State v.
Wendler, 312 Minn. 432, 252 N.W.2d 266 (1977). The Wendler court stated that the Rawl-
and decision merely held "that a factfinder may consider any competent evidence that
relates to cognition, volition, and capacity to control behavior, but the standard for a legal
finding of insanity was not altered." Id. at 434, 252 N.W.2d at 267-68. In State v. Larson,
281 N.W.2d 481 (Minn.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979), the court held that although
evidence regarding capacity to control behavior may be admitted, a jury instruction on
capacity to control behavior need not be given. Id. at 486. Presumably, a jury instruction
on the elements of cognition and volition also would not be required.
31. See State v. Rawland, 294 Minn. at 46, 199 N.W.2d at 790.
32. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. The irresistible impulse test states that
if the defendant is compelled by, or acts as a result of, a mental disease in a way which is
beyond his control--an insane, irresistible impulse-he is to be acquitted by reason of
19821
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ble impulse test, although he knew that his act was wrong, a defendant
will be exculpated if he proves that an irresistible impulse so affected his
freedom of will that he was not responsible for his conduct.3 3 The irresis-
tible impulse test is premised on the belief that "freedom of will" and
voluntary action are prerequisites to criminal responsibility.34 The irre-
sistible impulse must be the product of a mental disease, not merely the
uncontrollable fury or passion of a sane individual.
3 5
Approximately half of the states have at some time applied a variation
of the irresistible impulse test.36 Some courts have rejected the test.
3 7
Today, only two states use the irresistible impulse test.
38
2. The Durham Rule
The first substantial departure from the M'Naghten rule was in the
New Hampshire case of State v. Pike.39 The Pike court held that whether
insanity even if he knew that what he was doing was wrong. Although the defendant may
have known that his act was wrong, he can plead that an insane irresistible impulse so
affected his freedom of will that he was not responsible for his conduct. S. GLUEcK, supra
note 12, at 232.
33. See supra note 32.
34. S. GLUECK, supra note 12, at 233; see H. WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN
CRIMINAL LAW 44-45 (1933).
35. See H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 34, at 53; see also cases cited infra note 36.
36. See, e.g., Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887); Bell v. State, 120 Ark. 530,
180 S.W. 186 (1915); Ryan v. People, 60 Colo. 425, 153 P. 756 (1915); State v. Johnson, 40
Conn. 136 (1873); Carr v. State, 96 Ga. 284, 22 S.E. 570 (1895); People v. Lawhone, 292
Ill. 32, 126 N.E. 620 (1920); Morgan v. State, 190 Ind. 411, 130 N.E. 528 (1921); State v.
McGruder, 125 Iowa 741, 101 N.W. 646 (1904); Hall v. Commonwealth, 155 Ky. 541, 159
S.W. 1155 (1913); State v. Lyons, 113 La. 959, 37 So. 890 (1904); Commonwealth v. Gil-
bert, 165 Mass. 45, 42 N.E. 336 (1895); People v. Finley, 38 Mich. 482 (1878); State v.
Colbert, 58 Mont. 584, 194 P. 145 (1920); Territory v. Kennedy, 15 N.M. 556, 110 P. 854
(1910); Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio 146 (1872); Commonwealth v. De Marzo, 223 Pa. 573,
72 A. 893 (1909); Doherty v. State, 73 Vt. 380, 50 A. 1113 (1901); Thurman v. Common-
wealth, 107 Vir. 912, 160 S.E. 99 (1908); Flanders v. State, 24 Wyo. 81, 156 P. 39 (1916).
For a detailed analysis of these cases, see S. GLUECK, supra note 17, at 267-73.
37. See, e.g., People v. Hoin, 62 Cal. 120 (1882); Collins v. State, 88 Fla. 578, 102 So.
880 (1925); State v. Buck, 205 Iowa 1028, 219 N.W. 17 (1928); State v. White, 112 Kan.
83, 209 P. 660 (1922);State v. Scott, 41 Minn. 365, 43 N.W. 62 (1889); Commonwealth v.
Schroeder, 302 Pa. 1, 152 A. 835 (1930); Oborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249, 126 N.W. 737
(1910). For additional cases, see H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 34, at 57-58, n. 122.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has rejected the irresistible impulse test stating that
Minnesota's insanity defense statute provides the only grounds upon which the insanity
defense is allowed. See, e.g., State v. Scott, 41 Minn. 365, 371-72, 43 N.W. 62, 64 (1889).
38. Colorado has adopted the irresistible impulse test by statute. See COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 16-8-101 (1973). Virginia has retained the rule by judicial decision. See Thur-
man v. Commonwealth, 107 Va. 912, 916-17, 60 S.E. 99, 100 (1908); Dejarnette v. Com-
monwealth, 75 Va. 867, 878 (1881).
39. 49 N.H. 399 (1869). The defendant, Josiah L. Pike, was tried for the murder of
Thomas Brown whom he killed with an ax in the course of a robbery. Id. at 400. The
trial court instructed the jury that
the verdict should be "not guilty by reason of insanity" if the killing was the
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a defendant possessed the capacity to entertain criminal intent is a ques-
tion of fact, not of law.4O In contrast, the M'Naghten rule characterizes
the determination of criminal intent as one of law.4t
In 1954, the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia ap-
plied an expanded version of the Pike rule in Durham v. United States.42
offspring or product of mental disease in the defendant; that neither delusion nor
knowledge of right and wrong ... is, as a matter of law, a test of mental disease;
but that all symptoms and all tests of mental disease are purely matters of fact to
be determined by the jury.
Id. at 402. The charge was held correct on appeal, id. at 408, and was examined and
reaffirmed in a later case. See State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 399 (1871). The Ake test of
insanity was not accepted outside of the state of New Hampshire until 1954. See infra notes
43-47 and accompanying text.
In all states the presence or absence of insanity is a question of fact determined by the
jury, but the New Hampshire court's view, which is not very well understood by most
writers, is that the trial court simply declines to give the jury a legal standard by which to
measure the culpability of the defendant when insanity is asserted as a defense. See S.
GLUECK, supra note 12, at 254. Without a legal standard to apply, the New Hampshire
juries will apply their own legal standard which will necessarily result in an inconsistent
standard for the state.
40. See J. BtGGs, supra note 12, at 114; S. GLUECK, supra note 12, at 254-56. In State
v. Jones, 50 N.J. 369 (1871), the New Hampshire court stated that attempts to find a
universal test for insanity had utterly failed and the
reason of the failure . . . is, that it was an attempt to lay down as law that
which, from its very nature, is essentially matter of fact. It is a question of fact
whether any universal test exists, and it is also a question of fact what the test is,
if any there be.
Id. at 388. In 1971 the New Hampshire legislature enacted a statute which relates a per-
son's responsibility to his capacity to commit crime. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 628
(1974 & Supp. 1979). Section 628:2 provides, in pertinent part: "A person who is insane
at the time he acts is not criminally responsible for his conduct. Any distinction between a
statutory and common law defense of insanity is hereby abolished and invocation of such
defense waives no right an accused person would otherwise have." In 1979 a bill was
introduced into the New Hampshire legislature to amend § 628:2 by adopting in general
form the ALI test of insanity. S. 195,
I. A person is not criminally responsible for his conduct if when he acted he
lacked, because of mental disease or defect, substantial capacity to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law.
II. As used in this section, "mental disease or defect" means any abnormal con-
dition of the mind which substantially impairs the capacity of a person to control
his actions.
Id. § 1. The bill was referred to the Committee on Judiciary for interim study.
41. See J. BIGGs, supra note 12, at 114.
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently stated that intent is a factual issue and is
determined by use of an objective standard that "people operate within the broad bound-
aries of what is deemed normal or sane" and presumes people "are responsible for their
acts, iLe., that they have the capacity to intend what they do." State v. Bouwman, 328
N.W.2d 703, 705 (Minn. 1982). Thus, although Minnesota uses the M'Naghlen standard,
the issue of intent is one of fact.
42. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The court summarized the instructions given to
the jury as follows:
[A]ny instruction should in some way convey to the jury the sense and substance
of the following: If you the jury believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused was not suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition at the
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The Durham court held that "an accused is not criminally responsible if
his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect."
43
The court reasoned that by leaving the ultimate question of the defend-
ant's insanity to the jury, the jury could perform its traditional function
of applying "[o]ur inherited ideas of moral responsibility to individuals
prosecuted for crime." 44 Qnly Maine has adopted the Durham rule.4 5 In
contrast, in 1972 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia essentially overruled Durham by adopting the American Law Insti-
tute's test of insanity.46
time he committed the criminal act charged, you may find him guilty. If you
believe he was suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition when he
committed the act, but believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was not
the product of such mental abnormality, you may find him guilty. Unless you
believe beyond a reasonable doubt either that he was not suffering from a dis-
eased or defective mental condition, or that the act was not the product of such
abnormality, you must find the accused not guilty by reason of insanity. Thus
your task would not be completed upon finding, if you did find, that the accused
suffered from a mental disease or defect. He would still be responsible for his
unlawful act if there was no causal connection between such mental abnormality
and the act. These questions must be determined by you from the facts which
you find to be fairly deducible from the testimony and the evidence in this case.
Id. at 875. Thus the Durham rule provides that the disease or defective mental condition
need not be causally related to the act. See J. BiGGs, supra note 12, 155.
The Durham court rejected the previously accepted test which combined the
M'Naghlen rule with the irresistible impulse test, see, e.g., Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d
548 (D.C. Cir. 1929), because the prior test did not take sufficient account of psychic
realities and scientific knowledge and was based upon one symptom, defective cognition
(right versus wrong), which could not be validly applied in all circumstances. Id. at 874.
43. 214 F.2d 862, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The Durham court defined disease as a "con-
dition which is considered capable of either improving or deteriorating. . . . 'Defect' in
the sense of a condition which is not considered capable of either improving or deteriorat-
ing and which may be either congenital or as a result of injury, or the residual effect of a
physical or mental disease." Id. at 875.
44. Holloway v. United States, 143 F.2d 665, 666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (quoted in Dur-
ham, 214 F.2d at 876).
45. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 102 (1965); State v. Hathaway, 161 Me. 320,
211 A.2d 553 (1965). Maine subsequently amended its statute to conform with the ALI
test. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 39 (1975).
More typical of the state courts' reactions to the Durham rule is that of the Indiana
Supreme Court. That court specifically rejected the Durham rule because in the court's
opinion the rule conflicted with well-founded tenets of criminal responsibility. The court
opted for a test that recognized both cognition and volition as elements of criminal respon-
sibility. See Hill v. State, 252 Ind. 601, 608, 251 N.E.2d 429, 436 (1965).
46. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 977-78 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The Brawner
court articulated the obvious: The Durham court failed to "explicate what abnormality of
mind was an essential ingredient of [mental disease or defect]." By failing to define
mental disease or defect, application of the Durham rule resulted in "trial by label" be-
cause medical expert witnesses defined the terms in their own way. Id. The Circuit Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia highlighted this problem by briefly reviewing the
case of In re Rosenfield, 147 F. Supp. 18 (D.C. Cir. 1957):
A St. Elizabeth psychiatrist [a psychiatrist for the hospital where defendant re-
mained in custody] testified that a person with a sociopathic personality was not
suffering from a mental disease. That was Friday afternoon. On Monday morn-
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3. The American Law Institute Test
In 1963 the American Law Institute (ALI) adopted, as part of its
Model Penal Code, a new standard to evaluate insanity:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his con-
duct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or other-
wise anti-social conduct.
4 7
Twenty-six states have adopted the ALI test in whole or in part.4 8
ing, through a policy change at St. Elizabeth's Hospital, it was determined as an
administrative matter that the state of a psychopathic or sociopathic personality
did constitute a mental disease.
471 F.2d at 978.
See also Comment, United States v. Brawner The District of Columbia Abandons the Dur-
ham Insanity Defense, 25 ALA. L. REV. 342 (1973).
47. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The ALI test has
received its greatest modification by the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Cur-
rens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961). The Currens test for determination of criminal responsi-
bility is whether, at the time of committing the prohibited act, the defendant as a result of
mental disease or defect lacked "substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of law." Id. at 774. The limitation that prevents the jury from giving too
much weight to illegality of conduct restores the M'Naghten rule. See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 4, at 33.
48. Twenty-one states have adopted the ALl test or variations thereof by statute. See
ALA. CODE § 13A-3-1 (1977); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.085 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-
601 (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-13 (West Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 401 (1974); HAwAII REV. STAT. § 704-400 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2(a) (West
Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-6 (West 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.020,
504.060(4) (Baldwin 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A § 39 (Cum. Supp. 1981); MD.
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-107 (1982); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 768.21a (1982);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.05 (McKinney 1975); ,N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-04-03 (Supp. 1981);
OR. REV. STAT. § 161.295 (1981); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01 (Vernon 1974); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4801 (1974); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 971.15 (West 1971); Wyo. STAT. § 7-11-304(a) (1977).
Five states have adopted the ALI test by judicial decision. See People v. Drew, 22
Cal. 3d 333, 583 P.2d 1318, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1978) (overruling earlier cases articulating
M'Naghten); Commonwealth v. Mattson, 377 Mass. 638, 387 N.E.2d 546 (1979); State v.
Johnson, - R.I. -, 399 A.2d 469 (1979); Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn. 1977);
State v. Grimm, 156 W. Va. 615, 195 S.E.2d 637 (1973).
The ALI test has been adopted in most federal circuits. See United States v. Brawner,
471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970); Blake
v. United States, 407 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720 (6th
Cir. 1968); United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 736 (8th Cir.
1967) (jury charge usually will be legally sufficient if trial court freely admits all relevant
evidence, charge appropriately embraces and requires positive conclusions by jury regard-
ing defendant's cognition, volition, and capacity to control his behavior, and elements of
knowledge, will and choice are emphasized in charge as essential and critical components
of legal sanity); Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963); United States v.
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III. THE RATIONALE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE
The insanity defense is regarded as a fundamental right of which the
accused cannot be deprived.49 The Minnesota Supreme Court has ap-
proved the premise "that the basic postulate of our criminal law is a free
agent confronted with a choice between doing right and doing wrong
and choosing freely to do wrong."50 The primary goal of the criminal
law, however, is to protect members of society from unreasonable inter-
ferences with their lives, liberty and property. Society punishes parties
convicted of criminal offenses for reasons of retribution, deterrence, re-
straint and rehabilitation.51 These objectives are a means of obtaining
the primary goal of protection. To permit a person, whether sane or
insane, with "dangerous criminal tendencies to be in a position where he
can give indulgence to such propensities would be a folly which no com-
munity should suffer itself to commit."52 Too often acquittal by reason
of insanity allows a defendant to give free vent to his dangerous, criminal
propensities. Unless the goal of protecting the community conflicts with
the imposition of criminal sanctions against an insane person is there
justification for allowing insanity as a defense?
5 3
Although the insanity defense can be raised as a defense for any crime,
the defense usually is pled only in serious cases where long prison terms
threaten the accused. Offenders charged with relatively minor offenses
prefer to risk short sentences rather than the indeterminate civil confine-
ment that may follow an insanity acquittal. Consequently, insane de-
fendants charged with minor offenses often avoid needed psychiatric
treatment. 54 In addition, the insanity defense often is used only if a de-
fendant has no other defense. The defendant pleads the insanity defense
to avoid responsibility for his acts, rather than to obtain proper psychiat-
ric treatment. 5 5
The legal system has failed to recognize the function of the insanity
plea because the medical definition of insanity is unclear.56 Although
Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961);steaLro United States v. Mills, 434 F.2d 266, 274 (8th
Cir. 1970) (name of test or its form is not as important as jury charge which must encom-
pass the cognitive element as well as volition and capacity to control behavior).
49. See Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 160-61, 132 So. 581, 591 (1931) (Ethridge, J.,
concurring).
50. State v. Rawland, 294 Minn. 17, 32, 199 N.W.2d 774, 783 (1972).
51. See A. GoLDSTEIN,.supra note 4, at 11-15; W. LAFAVE & A. Sco'rr,supra note 4, at
22-23.
52. Commonwealth v. Ritter, 13 Pa. D. & C. 285, 291 (1930).
53. See Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"-- Why Not?, 72 YALE LJ. 853,
855 (1963).
54. See Platt, The Proposal to Abolish the Federal Insanity Defense: A Critique, 10 CAL.
W.L. REV. 449, 457 (1974).
55. See Stanfiel, The Questionabe Sanity of the Insanity Defense, 8 BARRISTER 19, 48
(1981).
56. The term "insanity" either has not been defined or has been defined only in vague
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"insanity" as used in the courtroom is a legal term and not a medical
term, medical experts routinely are called as witnesses to testify about a
defendant's sanity. Psychiatric testimony at trial usually is inconsistent
because there is no medical definition of insanity.57 Typically, both the
prosecution and the defense obtain psychiatric testimony that supports
their positions.58 Some sane defendants who are acquitted by reason of
insanity, should be convicted. Other defendants, who are insane, are
convicted although they need the medical help that acquittal by reason
of insanity could bring.
The rationale of the insanity defense has never been adequately
stated.59 A multitude of court opinions and scholarly works cite tradi-
tion or collective conscience,60 the requirement of mens rea,6 1 or lack of
freedom of choice62 as reasons for the defense. These reasons fail to ad-
dress society's primary need for protection from the dangerous propensi-
ties of the insane criminal.63 The American Law Institute has stated that
the purpose of the insanity defense is to "discriminate between cases
where a punitive-correctional disposition is appropriate and those in
which a medical-custodial disposition is the only kind law should al-
low."64 The ALl purpose addresses the disposition of the defendant after
trial rather than justifying the use of the insanity defense to avoid culpa-
bility at trial. Allowing insanity to function as a defense that relieves
defendants of responsibility for their acts frustrates society's goal of pro-
tecting its citizenry. Insanity should be relevant only to the disposition of
the defendant after the defendant's guilt has been determined at trial.
generalizations. See MINN. STAT. § 611.026 (1980); Platt, supra note 54, at 455; see also
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 714 (5th ed. 1979).
57. See Platt, supra note 54, at 445; see also Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366,
375 (1956).
58. See P. ROCHE, THE CRIMINAL MIND 149 (1958).
59. See Goldstein & Katz, supra note 53, at 859.
60. See, e.g., Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The court
stated "[olur traditions also require that where such acts stem from and are the product of
a mental disease or defect ... moral blame shall not attach, and hence there will not be
criminal responsibility." Id. at 876. In Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir.
1945), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 852 (1948), the court stated "[olur collective conscience does
not allow punishment where it can not impose blame." Id. at 666-67.
61. State v. Cooper, 170 N.C. 719, 722, 87 S.E. 50, 52 (1915); State v. Brown, 36 Utah
46, 55, 102 P. 641, 645 (1909).
62. Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1956); State v. Rawland,
294 Minn. 17, 37, 199 N.W.2d 774, 785 (1972).
63. John Monahan has stated that the average citizen needs the insanity defense as a
"crucial prop in a 'public morality play.' One groups' exculpation from criminal responsi-
bility shall inculcate moral responsibility in the rest of us." Monahan, Abolish the Insanity
Defense?-No Yet, 26 RUTGERs L. REv. 719, 721 (1973). Monahan's rationale is falla-
cious. If the insanity defense reinforces a sane individual's awareness of his responsibility
to society, prohibiting an insane person from escaping responsibility for criminal conduct
would make the sane person even more aware of his responsibility for his conduct.
64. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, Comment 1, at 156 (Tent. draft No. 4 1955).
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IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE INSANITY DEFENSE
A. Constitutionality of Eliminating the Insanity Defense
The United States Supreme Court has never directly considered
whether the insanity defense is required by the United States Constitu-
tion.6 5 Four state supreme courts, however, have considered the issue.
66
In 1909 the Washington legislature enacted a law which provided that
"[i]t shall be no defense to a person charged with the commission of a
crime that at the time of its commission he was unable, by reason of his
insanity, idiocy, or imbecility, to comprehend the nature and quality of
the act committed." 67 The Washington Supreme Court declared that
the statute unconstitutionally denied the defendant his right to trial by
jury.68 The court reasoned that a defendant has a right to have his guilt
determined by a jury and part of this determination involves the jury's
view of defendant's responsibility for his act.
69
In 1928 the Mississippi legislature abolished the insanity defense. 70
The Mississippi Supreme Court held that abolition of the insanity de-
fense violated the due process clauses of both the state and federal consti-
tutions, constituted cruel and unusual punishment, violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution, and violated the state constitutional guarantee to a jury trial.
71
65. See Dershowitz, Abolishing the Insanity Defense.- The Most Szgnifxant Feature of the Ad-
ministration's Proposed Cnminal Code-An Essay, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 434, 437 (1973).
66. See State v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 123 So. 639 (1929); State v. Hoffman, 328
N.W.2d 709 (Minn. 1982); Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931); Strasberg v.
State, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910).
67. Act of Mar. 22, 1909, ch. 249, § 7, 1909 Wash. Sess. Laws 890, 891-92.
68. Strasberg v. State, 60 Wash. 106, 119, 110 P. 1020, 1024 (1910).
69. Id. at 121, 110 P. at 1024. Justice Morris concurred with the majority opinion.
He, however, thought that the legislature had the power to abolish the insanity defense:
No man, whether sane or insane, has any constitutional right to commit crime,
and when the Legislature provides that the criminality of an act shall be deter-
mined by the act itself, and not by the mental condition of the man who com-
mits it, it violates none of the constitutional rights of the man accused of
crime. . . . [T]he same law-enacting body which has said that the insane man
cannot be guilty of a crime may destroy that immunity and determine the char-
acter of his act by the same rules as determine the act of a sane man.
Id. at 132, 110 P. at 1028. See Platt, supra note 54. The Washington statute expressly
prohibited any evidence of mental disease or defect which would go to specific elements of
the mens rea required for conviction. Id. at 459.
70. See Act of Apr. 3, 1928, ch. 75, 1928 Miss. Laws 92. "[Tihe insanity of the defend-
ant at the time of the commission of the crime shall not be a defense against indictments
for murder."
71. Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931). The court reasoned that it
would be cruel and unusual punishment to convict a person and impose a life sentence
when he was totally insane and incapable of knowing the nature of the act that he com-
mitted. The Mississippi court also found that the statute was violative of due process
because of its vagueness. The court held that the statute must define with certainty the
act and intent involved for a crime to comply with the requirements of due process. Id. at
583-86.
[Vol. 8
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss1/4
GUILTY BUT MENTALL Y ILL AL TERNA TIVE
In 1929 the Louisiana Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality
of a statute that vested a lunacy commission with absolute power to de-
termine whether an accused was then insane and whether he was insane
at the time of the commission of the offense. 72 The Louisiana court held
that the statute was unconstitutional because the statute denied the ac-
cused's right to a jury trial and vested in the commission powers reserved
to the court by the state constitution.
73
Recently the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Hoffman 74 held "that
a defendant has a due process constitutional right to assert the defense of
mental illness under both the state and federal constitutions."
7 5
The constitutional objections stated in these three cases elevate the
common-law mens rea requirement to constitutional stature. The courts
assumed that mens rea, or evil intent, was an essential element of every
crime. Judicial determination of the elements of criminal offenses, ac-
ceptable at common law,76 is inappropriate where crimes are defined
statutorily.77
Recently, three jurisdictions, Montana, 78 Idaho, 79 and Kansas,80 have
eliminated insanity as a separate affirmative defense and have limited
admission of evidence of the accused's psychological state at the time of
the offense to the issue of intent. The constitutionality of this approach,
referred to as the mens rea test,
8' has yet to be challenged. 82
Only legislatures should have the power to define which acts constitute
a crime; only legislatures should have the power to determine the sanc-
tions to be imposed for the violation of a statute.8 3 The legislature has
72. See State v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 123 So. 639 (1929).
73. The court found that the operation of the statute vested exclusive power in the
lunacy commission and precluded the plea of insanity from being presented before a judge
orjury. Therefore, even the right of trying such pleas before courts sitting without juries,
as existed before the adoption of the statute, was barred. Id. at 963, 123 So. at 641. The
court implied that the statute would be unconstitutional under the state's constitution as a
denial of due process. Id. at 966, 123 So. at 642.
74. 328 N.W.2d 709 (Minn. 1982).
75. Id. at 715.
76. See supra note 5.
77. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.015 (1963) which provided: "No act or omission is a
crime unless made so by [statute]." See also infia notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
78. Act of July 1, 1979, ch. 713, 1979 Mont. Laws 142 (current version at MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 46-14-210, -202, -203, -212, -213, -221, -222, -301, -311, -312, -313, -401, 46-
15-301 (1981)).
79. Act of Apr. 2, 1982, ch. 368, § 2, 1982 Idaho Sess. Laws 919, 919 (codified at
IDAHO CODE § 18-207(a) (Supp. 1982)).
80. Act of Apr. 9, 1980, ch. 105, 1980 Kansas Laws 483.
81. 128 CONG. REC. § 11390-91 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1982) (statement of Sen.
Thurmond).
82. See Rathke, Abolition of the Mental Illness Defense, 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 143,
161 (1982).
83. See, e.g., People v. Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d 169, 174, 534 P.2d 1001, 1006, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 102 (1975) (definition of crime uniquely in domain in legislature); People v.
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the authority to replace the element of "intent" with that of
"knowledge" 84 to require an individual to adhere to the reasonable per-
son standard,8 5 to define a crime without regard to the presence or ab-
sence of criminal intent,86 culpability, or knowledge,8 7 or to impose strict
liability.88 The legislative authority to define crimes is subject to consti-
tutional constraints.89 These constitutional constraints should not pro-
hibit the legislatures from precluding the insanity defense. That a
legislature has the authority to limit affirmative defenses to criminal
charges necessarily follows from the authority the legislature has to de-
fine the elements of a crime. 90 Consequently, a legislature has the consti-
tutional authority to abolish the insanity defense or provide a different
means of dealing with the insane offender.
Arellano, 185 Colo. 280, 283, 524 P.2d 305, 306-07 (1974) (legislature has inherent author-
ity to define crime); State v. Watts, 186 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Iowa 1971) (only legislature has
power to define and create crimes); State v. Forsman, 260 N.W.2d 160, 164 (Minn.
1977)(exclusive province of legislature to define by statute what acts constitute a crime);
State v. Witt, 310 Minn. 211, 214-15, 245 N.W.2d 612, 615-16 (1976) (state legislature
possesses broad discretion to define criminal offenses and prescribe penalties); Lapinski v.
State, 84 Nev. 611, 613, 446 P.2d 645, 646 (1968) (power to define crime lies exclusively in
legislature).
84. See Boyd v. State, - Ind. App. -, 396 N.E.2d 920, 923 (1979). This is also
recognized by statute in Minnesota. See MINN. STAT. § 609.02(9) (1980).
85. See, e.g., Bennett v. State, 211 So. 2d 520, 525 (Miss. 1968), appeal dismissed, 383
U.S. 320 (1969) ("The appellant had every reasonable ground as a reasonable man to
know that the property which he locked in the trunk of his car was stolen property
.. "); State v. Van Antwerp, 22 Wash. App. 674, 678, 591 P.2d 844, 848 (1979).
86. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. The implication of the holdings in the
strict liability cases is that an individual is not constitutionally guaranteed that intent or
mens rea will be an element in all crimes. The idea that mens rea is not a constitutionally
guaranteed element of criminal statutes is codified in Minnesota. MINN. STAT. § 609.015
(1980) provides that in Minnesota, common-law rules and concepts may be used only to
aid the court in construing the terms of criminal statutes. See also State v. Hayes, 244
Minn. 296, 298, 70 N.W.2d 110, 112-13 (1955) ("resort may be made to common law
concepts in aiding construction of such common law terms").
87. See, e.g., People v. McKee, 15 Mich. App. 382, 385-86, 166 N.W.2d 688, 690-91
(1968); State v. Hill, 170 N.J. Super. 485, 490, 406 A.2d 1334, 1336 (1979); State v. Kil-
lian, 37 N.C. App. 234, 236, 245 S.E.2d 812,814 (1978); State v. Turner, 78 Wash. 2d 276,
280-81, 474 P.2d 91, 94-95 (1970); State v. Van Antwerp, 22 Wash. App. 674, 680-82, 591
P.2d 844, 848 (1979).
88. See supra note 5.
89. See People ex rel Terrell v. District Court of Denver, 164 Colo. 437, 441, 435 P.2d
763, 765 (1967); State v. Clark, 247 Ind. 490, 495, 217 N.E.2d 588, 590-91 (1966); State v.
Shevlin-Carpenter Co., 99 Minn. 158, 164-65, 108 N.W. 935, 937, aj'd, 218 U.S. 57 (1906);
State v. Tucker, 183 Neb. 577, 579, 162 N.W.2d 774, 776 (1968); cf., State v. Forsman, 260
N.W.2d 160, 164 (Minn. 1977) (court's consideration of penal statute limited to statute's
constitutionality).
90. See Commonwealth v. Pickett, 244 Pa. Super. 433, 368 A.2d 799 (1976). In Pack-
ell, the court analyzed whether evidence of intoxication could be introduced to negate the
intent required for a finding of guilt. The court upheld the action of the legislature which
barred intoxication from being a defense to criminal charges. Id. at 436-37, 368 A.2d at
800.
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B. General Proposals
Consistent with the basic goal of criminal law-protection of the com-
munity-most alternatives to the traditional insanity defense require
that the determination of a defendant's sanity be made at the disposi-
tional stage rather than the guilt-finding stage.9 1 One proposal provides
that a jury would first determine whether a defendant committed a crim-
inal act. If the defendant is convicted, a panel of medical experts would
decide whether the defendant should be incarcerated in a prison or sent
to a mental health facility.92 Critics of this proposal claim that, like the
outright abolition of the insanity defense, the proposal violates the con-
stitutional guarantees of a jury trial and due process, deprives the jury of
the determination of criminal intent, and constitutes a radical departure
from substantive and procedural criminal law.93
Another proposal also provides that a jury would first determine
whether the defendant committed a criminal act. If the defendant is
convicted, the jury makes findings regarding the defendant's danger to
himself and the community. If the defendant is found to be presently
dangerous, a panel of medical and penological experts decides on appro-
priate treatment and commit the defendant to the appropriate institu-
tion. 04 This proposal is not subject to the problems posed by abolishing
the insanity defense because the proposal operates independently from
the insanity defense.9 5 By pleading insanity, the defendant might influ-
ence the jury's determination of the defendant's dangerousness, but the
jury's determination would not automatically result in civil commitment
proceedings. A problem with this proposal is that an insane defendant
who is not found presently dangerous would not receive psychiatric
treatment.
C. The Guily-But-Mentally-Ill Alternative
Within the last decade several jurisdictions have experimented with a
new verdict that allows the factfinder to find an insane defendant "guilty
but mentally ill." In 1975 the Michigan legislature became the first to
enact the guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict.96 The Indiana legislature fol-
91. See generaly S. HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME 205-29
(1967); Platt, supra note 54, at 458, citing B. WOOTEN, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW:
REFLECTIONS OF A MAGISTRATE AND SOCIAL SCIENTIST 51-57 (1963); Schwedel &
Roether, The Dispositon Heaing:. An Alternative to the Insanity Defense, 49 J. URB. L. 711, 712,
723-25 (1972); Note, supra note 12, at 114-18.
92. See Note, supra note 12, at 115.
93. Id.; see also supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
94. See Note, supra note 12, at 115-16. The defendant's right to trial by jury is pro-
tected by the jury finding both the facts of the crime and the defendant's present danger
to society or himself. In addition, due process standards are complied with because the
jury periodically examines changes in the defendant's condition. Id. at 116.
95. Id. at 116.
96. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 768.36 (1980). Michigan does not have a statutory
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lowed suit in 198097 as did the Illinois legislature in 1981.98 Currently,
seven jurisdictions provide statutorily for the verdict.99
Under the Michigan law,OO a defendant may be found guilty but
mentally ill if he asserts a defense of legal insanity and the trier of fact
finds three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: "(a) That the defend-
ant is guilty of an offense, (b) That the defendant was mentally ill at the
time of the commission of the offense and (c) That the defendant was not
legallylOl sane at the time of the commission of the offense."102 If the
defendant is found guilty but mentally ill,103 the court must impose the
same sentence that a sane defendant convicted of the same offense would
receive.1o 4 The defendant may be committed to the custody of the de-
partment of mental health to be evaluated and treated for his mental
illness.105 After treatment has been provided, the defendant is returned
provision incorporating an insanity defense. Rather, the Michigan law merely defines
"legal insanity" as follows:
(1) A person is legally insane, if, as a result of mental illness. . . or as a result
of mental retardation. . . that person lacks substantial capacity either to appre-
ciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law.
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 768.21a (1980). It is left to the courts to instruct the jury as to
the appropriate elements of the state's insanity defense. The Michigan courts have tradi-
tionally applied M'lMaghten plus irresistible impulse. E.g., People v. Martin, 28 Mich. App.
633, 635, 184 N.W.2d 744, 745 (1970). In 1979, however, the Michigan Court of Appeals
appeared to have adopted the major elements of the ALI test. See People v. Sorna, 88
Mich. App. 351, 360, 276 N.W.2d 892, 896 (1979). A decision subsequent toSoma seemed
to further blur the Michigan standard. See People v. Morris, 92 Mich. App. 747, 749, 285
N.W.2d 446, 447 (1979).
97. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-5-2-3 (Burns 1981). The Indiana insanity defense is an
adaptation of the ALI test. See id. § 35-41-3-6 (Burns 1981); supra notes 47-49 and accom-
panying text.
98. Act of Sept. 17, 1981, Pub. Act No. 82-553, 1981 Il1. Laws 2782 (amending ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 6-2, 6-4, 113-4, -5, 115-1, -2, -3, -4, -6, 1005-2-5, 1005-2-6 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1981)).
99. Set supra notes 96-98; Act of June 9, 1981, Pub. Act No. 81-301, § 1, 1981 Conn.
Acts 437, 437 (amending CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-13 (West 1972)); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 27-1503 (Harrison Cum. Supp. 1982); Act of Mar. 26, 1982, ch. 113, § 7, 1981 Ky. Acts
199, 201 (to be codified in Ky. REV. STAT. ch. 504); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-91-3(A) (Cum.
Supp. 1982).
100. See MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 768.36 (1980).
101. "Mental illness" is defined as a "substantial disorder of thought or mood which
significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope
with the ordinary demands of life." Id. § 330.1400a.
102. Id. § 768.36(1).
103. A defendant may also assert a defense of insanity, waive his right to trial, and
with the prosecutor's approval, enter a plea of guilty but mentally ill. The court cannot
accept such a plea until satisfied that the defendant was mentally ill at the time he com-
mitted the offense. Id. § 768.36(2).
104. Id. § 768.36(3). The defendant may, however, be placed on parole for a mini-
mum of five years after the offense. Id. § 768.36(4).
105. Id. § 768.36(3).
[Vol. 8
18
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss1/4
GUILTY BUT MENTALL Y ILL AL TERNA TIVE
to the department of corrections to serve the remainder of his term.106
The Michigan Appellate Court has held that this statutory procedure is
constitutional. 107
Indiana's version of the guilty-but-mentally-ill alternative 0 8 is similar
to Michigan's with one important difference. The Indiana statute does
not require the defendant to return to the department of corrections after
completion of psychiatric treatment.10 9
Under the recently adopted Illinois law,'10 "guilty but mentally ill"
can be pled by the defendant I l or be an alternative verdict,11 2 if in-
sanity has been raised as a defense. The trial court may impose any sen-
tence on a defendant who has pled or been adjudged guilty but mentally
ill that it could impose on someone convicted of the same offense.' t 3 The
defendant must serve his full term whether he is incarcerated in a state
hospital for treatment, or in a prison. 114 In 1981 the United States De-
partment of Justice recommended legislation modeled after the Illinois
statute that would create a federal guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict.' '5
106. Id. The defendant, upon return to the department of corrections, is entitled to
the same parole possibilities as other inmates.
107. See, e.g., People v. Darwall, 82 Mich. App. 652, 274 N.W.2d 472 (1978) (not viola-
tive of equal protection clause as verdict bears reasonable relation to state's interest in
protecting society from insane defendants exhibiting dangerous tendencies and in securing
proper treatment for them). For criticism of Michigan's new law, see Schwartz, Michigan's
New Law on Criminal Responsibih'--Moving Backward Confidently, 54 MICH. ST. B.J. 847
(1975).
108. See IND. CODE § 35-5-2-3 (Cum. Supp. 1980). The court or jury may choose be-
tween verdicts of guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty but mentally ill. Id.
§ 35-5-2-3(a). The court is to sentence the defendant in the same manner as a defendant
found guilty of the offense. Id. § 35-5-2-6(a). The defendant is then further evaluated by
the department of corrections or the department of mental health. Id. § 35-5-2-6(b).
109. Compare id. § 35-5-2 with MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 768.36(3) (1980).
110. Act of Sept. 17, 1981, Pub. Act No. 82-553, 1981 Ill. Laws 2782 (amending ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 6-2, 6-4, 133-4, -5, 115-1, -2, -3, -4, -6, 1005-2-5, 1005-2-6).
111. Id. § 1, 1981 Ill. Laws at 2782-83 (amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 6-4). The
court cannot accept the plea of guilty but mentally ill until the defendant has undergone
psychiatric treatment and the judge has 1) examined the treatment record, 2) held a hear-
ing to determine the defendant's mental condition, and 3) found that there is a factual
basis to the defendant's claim that he was mentally ill at the time of the offense. Id. § 2,
1981 Il1, Laws at 2783-87 (amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 113-4, 5, 115-1, -2, -3, -4, -
5, -6). If the defendant's plea of guilty but mentally ill is accepted by the court, only a
presentence hearing is held. Id. § 3, 1981 111. Laws at 2787-88 (amending ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 115-1).
112. If the defense of insanity is raised at trial and evidence is provided sufficient to
warrant the defense, the trial judge shall provide the jury with the special verdict form of
guilty but mentally ill. If the jury finds that the defendant committed the offense charged
and that he was not legally sane at the time he committed the offense, the verdict of guilty.
but mentally ill may be returned. Id. § 2, 1981 111. Laws at 2783, 2786.
113. Id. § 3, 1981 Ill. Laws at 2787-88.
114. Id.
115. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, FINAL REPORT (1981).
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In effect, the guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict will eliminate the insanity
defense.116 A jury required to choose between the verdicts of not guilty
by reason of insanity or guilty but mentally ill, will choose the latter
verdict. A verdict of guilty but mentally ill allows a jury to condemn a
defendant's behavior and keep a potentially dangerous person in cus-
tody. In addition, the jury will believe that by finding the defendant
mentally ill, he will receive medical treatment. 17
The guilty-but-mentally-ill alternative satisfies the basic goal of crimi-
nal law-protection of the community-better than any of the insanity
defenses and allows the community to condemn the defendant's actions
while providing the defendant with psychiatric treatment.1 18
V. CONCLUSION
Medical science has not progressed to the point where medical experts
can testify accurately about a defendant's ability to conform his conduct
to a legal standard at the time a crime was committed.1l 9 More impor-
tantly, medical experts cannot conclude reliably whether a defendant
will repeat his criminal conduct in the future. As long as medical experts
are unable to reliably predict the behavior of the dangerously insane de-
fendant, the insanity defense poses a threat to the community's safety.
Society must protect itself from insane offenders and provide those of-
fenders with psychiatric treatment. This dual objective can best be met
by the guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict.
The Minnesota legislature should adopt a modified version of Michi-
gan's guilty-but-mentally-ill statute. The definition of "mental illness"
should include persons who are insane by the legal standards 120 as well as
persons with less serious mental problems. The defendant should be re-
moved from the community for at least the minimum period required by
the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelinesl21 and should not be released until
a court formally determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the defend-
ant is no longer dangerous.122
116. See Note, The Constitutionality of Michigan's Cuzy But Mentall Verdict, 12 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 188, 196-97 (1978). One writer suggests that elimination of the insanity
defense is the major potential problem with the guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict. See Com-
ment, Guilty But Mentally Il/: An His~torcal and ConstitutionalAnalysis, 53 J. URB. L. 471, 492-
93 (1976).
117. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
118. See Platt, supra note 54, at 457 (citing H.L.A. HART, THE MORALITY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW (1964)).
119. See Rathke, supra note 80, at notes 143-55 and accompanying text.
120. For the current definition of "mentally ill person" in Minnesota, see supra note 24.
121. Minnesota provides for greater scrutiny of the confinement and release of those
individuals found to be mentally ill and dangerous, or not guilty by reason of insanity. See
MINN. STAT. §§ 253A. 15, .16, .23 (1980).
122. Under present law a defendant, acquitted by reason of insanity, will be incarcer-
ated for less time than an equally guilty but sane defendant. Id.
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Jurors confronted with a defense of insanity tend to ask "Was the de-
fendant so crazy that he should be hospitalized rather than impris-
oned?"12 3 The guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict allows the jury to avoid
having to choose between the prison and the asylum. The guilty-but-
mentally-ill verdict would profoundly affect the traditional concepts of
criminal responsibility and the insanity defense because the defense
would no longer provide the escape of last resort. More importantly, the
guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict would restore the primary purpose of the
criminal justice system-protecting the community from persons who
threaten public safety-to its rightful place by having that purpose re-
main primary in all criminal cases without impinging on the constitu-
tional rights of insane criminal defendants.
123. See Dershovitz, supra note 65, at 437-38.
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